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THE DISCONNECTED JUROR: SMART DEVICES AND
JURIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE OF LITIGATION
PATRICK C. BRAYER*
INTRODUCTION
[M]odern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insis-
tent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might
conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.1
The power of digital connection and disconnection is evident in
our everyday lives.  Members of modern society comprehend the
incredible advantages that come with constant communication.  The
smart phone, in particular, has allowed us to marshal the technological
advances of the internet, social media, and mobile devices.  It has
changed the way we work, interact, and organize.2  Digital innovation
has indeed changed the operating system of society, creating new com-
munities and empowering people with revolutionary tools of
interaction.3
Conversely, we see and sometimes feel the real life discomfort of
disconnection.  We watch movies and news reports poking fun at young
adults experiencing the anxiety of temporarily being disconnected
from texts and social media platforms.4  We hear the complaints of
friends and family when their devices have failed to maintain a signal or
establish a connection.  And for many of us, the preoccupation with
checking messages and emails is not foreign.  But as professionals,
charged with the task of selecting juries, do we completely understand
the impact when courts remove a smart phone from the hands of a
sitting and/or deliberating juror?
* Patrick Brayer is the Deputy District Defender of the St. Louis County Trial
Office.  He has served as the St. Louis area regional coordinator of law students and
interns for the Missouri State Public Defender System, where he is a twenty-seven year
veteran of the trial division.  This article represents his personal opinions and beliefs.
Special thanks to Katie Ricks, Eleanor Gourley, and Sarah Rockefeller for their input,
suggestions, and insights.  Also, special thanks to Mari Katherine Webb for convincing me
to incorporate Riley v. California into my analysis.
1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).  In the majority opinion, Justice
Roberts speaks to the inseparable connection individuals have to their smart devices. Id.
at 2494–95.  His observation of cell phones becoming an “important feature” of the
human body is a central idea of this article. Id. at 2484.
2. LEE RAINIE & BARRY WELLMAN, NETWORKED: THE NEW SOCIAL OPERATING SYSTEM
6–7, 34 (2012); JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO 70 (2010); BRIAN X.
CHEN, ALWAYS ON: HOW THE IPHONE UNLOCKED THE ANYTHING-ANYTIME-ANYWHERE
FUTURE—AND LOCKED US IN 162 (2011).
3. RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 2, at 6–7. R
4. See, e.g., THIS IS 40 (Universal Pictures 2012). See also Dateline: Digital Detox (NBC
television broadcast Jan. 23, 2013).
25
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Is the modern-day trial attorney or trial judge aware of the effects
of digital isolation on the contemporary juror caused by court rules reg-
ulating the use or possession of digital devices by sitting jurors?  This
article will discuss how removing a juror’s smart phone (or device), or
forbidding its possession or excessively controlling its use at any stage of
jury service can have an unintended impact on jurors, affecting their
understanding of the evidence, their deliberations, and ultimately their
verdict.
In the first part of this article, I will draw from the work of social
scientists from a variety of disciplines, and illustrate the power of digital
connection and disconnection on individuals and, specifically, sitting
jurors.  In the second part of this piece, I will review the existing litera-
ture on how federal and state courts, from a variety of jurisdictions,
currently ban smart phone possession by jurors or greatly restrict their
use.  This section will also address how the Supreme Court has implic-
itly acknowledged that a juror’s smart device contains the individual
narrative of his or her private life.5  In this article, I will argue how Riley
v. California6 recognized the powerful expectation individuals have in
maintaining control of the information in their phones, and how sepa-
rating a juror from his or her device could promote extreme anxiety.
In the third part of this article, I will comment on the need for the legal
community as a whole to comprehend and prepare for the evolution of
the modern digital juror and embrace a new model of juror empower-
ment.  This preparation will require courts, scholars, and litigators to
develop new and innovative methods of venire selection and case pres-
entation, accommodating a whole generation of fact finders; a genera-
tion that has never known a life without the internet, social medial, or
smart devices.7
Today’s juror lives in a changing culture brought about by a revolu-
tion in mobile device technology.8  Many have created a lifestyle of con-
nection that includes an expectation of “continuous access” to friends,
family, and information.9  The phone in the hand of a potential juror is
more than a device; for some individuals, it is an element of their very
existence and contains all the information of their private lives.10
These individuals regard their digital device as a preferred mode of
interaction, and their device defines how they relate socially and profes-
sionally to their world.11  Each individual juror is likely in possession of
a piece of technology that links him or her with a community that
brings support, comfort, acceptance, a sense of survival, and a place to
store the most sensitive private and professional information.12  The
5. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95.
6. Id.
7. See Patrick C. Brayer, The Connected Lawyer: The Evolving “Operating System” of the
Networked Professional, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. ONLINE 84, 99 (2014); see generally RAINIE &
WELLMAN, supra note 2, at 95. R
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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existence of a social network that sustains an individual is no longer a
new phenomenon, and an expectation of ubiquitous connection to a
network of one’s choosing has become a new societal norm.13  As such,
an expectation of ubiquitous connection and constant possession of
one’s private thoughts, information, and associations will accompany
each juror who possesses a smart device.
I. THE SCIENCE OF CONNECTION
A. Research at the Crossroads
“iPhone Separation Anxiety Makes You Dumber, Study Finds”14
In January of 2015, researchers published a study suggesting that
an individual’s ability to complete cognitive tasks is impacted by the
anxiety he or she feels when separated from his or her iPhone.15  The
researchers asked participants to complete word search puzzles, exam-
ining their level of anxiety and cognition, while removing their iPhone
and causing the device to ring.16  The research showed that:
iPhone separation and the inability to answer one’s iPhone during
cognitive tasks affects a variety of psychological outcomes.  The
data showed that the inability to answer one’s iPhone while it was
ringing activated the aversive motivational system (increases in
heart rate and unpleasantness), and also led to a decline in cogni-
tive performance.17
Significantly, the researchers determined it may not be the ringing of
the phones that caused distracted thinking, but rather the separation of
the user from his or her phone.  “Our findings suggest that iPhone sep-
aration can severely impact attention during cognitive tasks.”18
This research raises an important issue for individuals who study
the impact of smart phone usage by jurors.  If individuals detecting but
not being able to respond to incoming calls or texts results in cognitive
impairment and anxiety, the act of banning the possession of smart
phones by jurors is scientifically justified.  Alternatively, separation from
our smart phones may impact attention to “all areas of our lives includ-
ing communicating with strangers, friends and family, colleagues, and
care-providers.  Simply not being able to answer one’s iPhone may
reduce attention toward those daily interactions.”19  If jurors are cogni-
tively impaired when severed from their devices of digital connection,
13. Id. at 6, 13, 34, 95.
14. Jack Linshi, iPhone Separation Anxiety Makes You Dumber, Study Finds, TIME (Jan.
11, 2015), http://time.com/3662846/iphone-seperation-study.  This headline is one
example of how media interpreted a 2015 study describing the cognitive emotional and
physiological impact of iPhone separation anxiety.  See also Russell B. Clayton et al., The
Extended iSelf: The Impact of iPhone Separation on Cognition, Emotion and Physiology, 20 J. COM-
PUTER MEDIATED COMM. 119 (2015).
15. Clayton et al., supra note 14, at 133.
16. Id. at 123.
17. Id. at 132.
18. Id. at 133.
19. Id.
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courts that remove phones are diminishing the traditional benefits of a
trial by jury, including the synergistic power of a deliberating body that
is intellectually vibrant and emotionally attentive.  In short, the ques-
tion at the crossroads of research is whether it is the ringing of or the
separation from a smart device that causes distraction.  In this article we
venture down the road less traveled by advancing a theoretical founda-
tion for allowing jurors to keep their devices at all phases of the trial
process, including deliberations.  As we contemplate the new norm of
connection we can begin to understand the effect of disconnection on
sitting jurors.20
B. The New Normal of Connection
To adequately understand the new normal of constant connection,
it is important to consider the reality of future generations of jurors
having never known a life without smart phones, social media, or the
internet.21  Younger jurors have matured in an era where they and all
their peers are connected to a social network at all times, even at night
while sleeping.22  Connection has progressed beyond how individuals
interact; connection has become an essential part of how young adults
define who they are.23
The existentialism of human digital connection came into being
when individual relationships ceased to depend on time or place.24  A
person defines him or herself by the people or absence of people in his
or her life.25  Traditionally, when we interacted with our family, friends,
work, or community, it was dependent upon face-to-face or phone con-
tact at a definable place and time, with little expectation for uninter-
rupted connection.26  Social media, text messaging, and the
convenience of smart devices have diminished the impact of place and
time on the interactions that define individual existence.27  When time
and place is removed from the calculus of human connection, a new
paradigm of digital expectation is created.  Individuals are expecting
constant access to the people and information that define who they are
and at times, who they want to become.  Conversely, jury duty is a man-
date, by its very nature defined by a place and a time.
MIT researcher Sherry Turkle describes how a new generation of
individuals has become socialized to depend on new digital technol-
ogy.28  She illustrates how many of today’s young adults had parents
who were physically present but distracted by their own use of technol-
20. SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY
AND LESS FROM EACH OTHER 177 (2011).
21. See RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 2, at 95. R
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See generally id. at 108.
27. Id.
28. TURKLE, supra note 20, at 178, 266.
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ogy.29  Her case studies and research reveal that many younger adults
(and by extension jurors) will have been raised by parents who spent
time talking on cell phones, or answering and reading messages or
email on BlackBerries and laptops, rather than dedicating their full
attention to their children.30
Over the past two decades, the association of “technology with
shared attention” took root in the mind of developing adults.31  Tech-
nologically distracted parents became a compromise to the alternative
of absent parents and empty houses; a byproduct of work and career
obligations.32  Parents were no longer physically absent because of time
and place requirements, but mentally absent because of technology.
For the children of the distracted parent, digital connection became
the new learned mode of social connection.  Simultaneously, digital
technology continued to improve, with devices providing a network of
contacts and information, available at any time in any place.33  If our
network is always with us and we have been raised to associate connec-
tion with attention, then does our network become an inseparable part
of who we are?  Does constant access to that network becomes the new
normal?
For other researchers like Lee Rainie and Berry Wellman, Direc-
tors of the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project and
of NetLab at the University of Toronto, “networked individualism” is
less about an individual’s need for attention and more about empower-
ment and how today’s user of “mobile connectivity” exercises control
over support networks and information.34  The “triple revolution” of
internet, social media, and mobile technology has allowed the individ-
ual to step away from traditional hierarchical relationships, allowing a
free expression of ideas with less dependency on the structure of a fixed
group.35  Today, jurors have the ability to create and efficiently manage
networks of their own choosing, bringing together individuals who
share interests and provide friendship and support.  Information, com-
panionship, and assistance are available at any time and in any place,
expanding an individual’s ability to socialize, work, and organize.36
For Rainie and Wellman, the autonomy and control of networked
individualism have resulted in a new “social operating system.”37  An
evolving framework has emerged, redefining how individuals interact
and connect to their world.38  People are no longer small, voiceless
cogs in a larger organization; they have evolved into the autonomous
29. Id.
30. Id. at 266–67.
31. Id. at 267.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 268.
34. See RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 2, at 107. R
35. Id. at 11–12, 107.
36. Id. at 108.
37. See id. at 6–7, 34. See also Jacqueline Olds, Online Optimism, 100 AM. SCIENTIST
514 (2012), http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/online-optimism (review-
ing RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 2). R
38. RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 2, at 6–7, 34. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\30-OL\NDE002.txt unknown Seq: 6 28-JUN-16 9:14
30 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY ONLINE [Vol. 30
center of a network of individuals and information of their choosing.39
They have a digital voice that can be heard around the world from any
location, directed instantaneously to any number of people at any time
of the day or night.40  This new system of operation defines our identity
in today’s society.41  Our new social operating system further frames
how the modern American juror functions and experiences his or her
world.  This new individual functionality and experience is resulting in
a new normalcy for fact finders; a new normal of jurors expecting con-
stant digital autonomy and control.
C. Digital Dependency
When trial judges and litigators come face-to-face with a panel of
prospective jurors, they are connecting with an authentic group of indi-
viduals possessing real life experiences, and in some cases, addictions.
If juries are selected fairly without bias or systemic prejudice, then the
modern American jury will represent a true cross section of today’s soci-
ety.42  When the public becomes part of the judicial system, they bring
genuine behaviors and dependencies into the jury box and deliberation
room.  But do judges and trial attorneys comprehend the addictive
nature of our modern devices of connection?  Additionally, does the
legal profession appreciate the impact of digital dependency on how it
achieves its goal of empanelling diligent juries who are attentive and
thoughtful?
The evolution of smart devices, social media, and the internet has
resulted in a number of mental health experts and social scientist
expressing concern over individuals becoming addicted to modern
modes of connection.43  In outlining the problem, these researchers
have taken an expansive view of digital addiction, never associating the
phenomenon to a limited few.44  For these professionals, this type of
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 95. See also Manuel Castells, Afterword to HANDBOOK OF MOBILE COMMUNI-
CATIONS STUDIES 448-49 (James E. Katz ed., 2008) (“[W]e now have a wireless skin
overlaid on the practices of our lives, so that we are in ourselves and in our networks at
the same time.”).
42. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
xi (2000) (“Precisely because we all inevitably view the evidence at trial from perspectives
shaped by the lives we live in America, diversity is important to the accuracy of jury ver-
dicts.  Representative juries are better able to ‘mix it up’ during deliberation, the precon-
ceptions of some calling into doubt the predisposition of others. . . .  On a representative
jury, persuasive people are those who make arguments capable of convincing across the
traditional demographic divides.”).
43. TURKLE, supra note 20, at 16; JACQUELINE OLDS & RICHARD S. SCHWARTZ, THE
LONELY AMERICAN: DRIFTING APART IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 112 (2010); LANIER,
supra note 2, at 70; CHEN, supra note 2, at 159. R
44. See, e.g., Olds, supra note 37, at 514–15 (“That checking e-mail can be addictive
has become a truism.  And the danger of those gadgets seems to me to be that even when
we are connecting with others face to face, a small part of our brain is preoccupied with
whether a truly exciting e-mail or text is about to arrive.”).
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addiction is real and pervasive, accompanied by the same anxieties and
dangers as other forms of dependence.45
In times of connection, people express feelings of “enhancement”
and “invincibility,” contrasted with the emotions associated with discon-
nection, feeling “terrified” and “adrift.”46  Most alarming have been the
studies comparing digital addiction with chemical dependency, describ-
ing how participants experienced traditional withdrawal symptoms
when disconnected from “Twitter, Facebook, IM, web browsing and tel-
evision for 24 hours.”47  Participants described themselves as feeling
“isolated” and “lonely” and confronted with their own rationalizations
for why they needed to re-connect.48  Research demonstrates that the
mood of people in general, and thus, sitting jurors, could be impacted
by people’s ability to connect to people, networks, and information.49
A common theme advanced by both researchers and study sub-
jects, is how devices and the network they represent are evolving into a
digital body part or “overlaid” skin that is inseparable from our being.50
And “exclusion from social networks and text messaging can reduce
that feeling of belonging,” setting “off pain signals in the brain.”51
Regardless of whether these metaphorical research themes adequately
explain how digital dependency takes hold, the legal community must
be informed by established findings linking both mental and physical
health to our basic ability to connect.52  This idea of devices becoming
a part of our person has been advanced by both researchers and a
Supreme Court Chief Justice.53  The sitting juror, deciding the fate of
another human being, may be experiencing all the emotions, moods,
and withdrawal symptoms mentioned above.  Jurors view evidence and
conduct deliberations through the prism of their emotional being and
the filter of real life discomforts that transcend feelings of mere incon-
venience.54  Just like lawyers, a juror’s cognition and emotional state
45. TURKLE, supra note 20, at 16.
46. Id. at 16, 152.
47. CHEN, supra note 2, at 159 (describing a study conducted at the University of R
Maryland titled “Unplugged,” where 200 students voluntarily gave up all media for a
twenty-four hour period.  Of special consideration for this article is how media in the
study was considered Twitter, Facebook, IM, and web browsing) (citing Susan D. Moeller,
A Day Without Media, INT’L CTR. FOR MEDIA & THE PUB. AGENDA, http://without-
media.wordpress.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2016)).
48. CHEN, supra note 2, at 159–60. R
49. See id. at 159 (identifying specific participant quotes from the University of
Maryland study.  Many of the subjects made comments indicating their general mood was
impacted shortly after disconnecting from all media.).
50. Id.; TURKLE, supra note 20, at 16; RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 2, at 95. R
51. CHEN, supra note 2, at 161.
52. OLDS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 112.
53. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
54. See Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation
and Negotiation, in RELATIONSHIP-CENTERED LAWYERING: SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY FOR TRANS-
FORMING LEGAL PRACTICE 307, 309, 310, 314–15 (Susan L. Brooks & Robert G. Madden
eds., 2010) (discussing the importance of emotion in the deliberative process and the
inability of many judges and lawyers to comprehend how emotion is linked to cognition).
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are inseparably linked.55  A deeper study into the visceral response
caused by digital disconnection reveals changes in mood and emotion
that are based on the very rational need to avoid ostracism, exclusion,
and humiliation.56  “These converging lines of reasoning—common
sense, evolutionary psychology, neurobiology and social psychology—
lead us right back to the idea that feeling left out is a major engine of
human emotion and behavior, fundamental to our way of being in the
world.”57  Such feelings of exclusion can be equally as powerful when
perceived, regardless of the fact the apparent ostracism is not based in
reality.58
A byproduct of our reliance on digital technology is a greater
occurrence of people exaggerating their feelings of exclusion.59  This
modern social phenomenon has emerged because individuals are less
dependent on face-to-face interaction, decreasing their use of reassur-
ing non-verbal (and non-digital) body language, encouraging manner-
isms and comforting gestures.60  To date, digital communication is
dominated by the written word and unable to fully utilize the unspoken
language communicated when people come together in person to
share a task or a chat.61  An individual’s survival has been traditionally
rooted in our ability as a species to gather in small groups in the same
location and maintain connection with the tools of human interac-
tion.62  Absent the reassurance of non-verbal nurturing in our digital
connections, people are subject to greater feelings of exclusion, forced
to constantly monitor and maintain their online survival networks.63
Taking away a juror’s ability to text and engage in social media, for
any duration of time, can directly influence the fact finder’s feeling of
55. See GERALD M. EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, BRILLIANT FIRE: ON THE MATTER OF THE
MIND 176 (1992) (stating that neurobiologists have advanced the idea of emotions being
a cogitatively strong mix of “feelings with willing and with judgments”). See also Ryan,
supra note 54, at 309–10 (discussing the benefits of lawyers having emotional wisdom).
56. See CHEN, supra note 2, at 161–62; OLDS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 76; R
LANIER, supra note 2, at 70.  These researchers connect the emotional state associated with R
disconnection to the basic human need for survival.  Ostracism and being “left out” of a
social group become paramount to social isolation. Id.
57. OLDS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 76.
58. Id. at 77.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Mark Bauerlein, Why Gen-Y Johnny Can’t Read Nonverbal Cues, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 12, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020386320457434849
3483201758.html.  Mark Bauerlein is also the author of the book THE DUMBEST GENERA-
TION: HOW THE DIGITAL AGE STUPEFIES YOUNG AMERICANS AND JEOPARDIZES OUR FUTURE
(OR, DON’T TRUST ANYONE UNDER 30) (2008); Brayer, supra note 7 (discussing Bauerlein’s
observation). See also OLDS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 77 (discussing how humans
interact).
62. OLDS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 77.
63. See LANIER, supra note 2, at 70 (“I am always struck by the endless stress they put R
themselves through.  They must manage their online reputations constantly, avoiding the
ever-roaming evil eye of the hive mind, which can turn on an individual at any moment.
A ‘Facebook generation’ young person who suddenly becomes humiliated online has no
way out, for there is only one hive.”); see also CHEN, supra note 2, at 162. R
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personal belonging and survival.64  This reality is best demonstrated by
studying individuals who had a firm understanding of the dangers of
texting while driving.65  Despite their understanding of the risk, individ-
uals in one study continued to text and drive and rationalized how their
own actions would be safe.66  If the power of digital connection is so
compelling that people would risk their own lives and the lives of others
to text, how would that same influence affect a deliberating juror who is
responsible for the life of another but forced to abstain from all forms
of digital connection for an undefined period of time?
As legal professionals, our common sense and real-life experience
informs us that we will confront an increasing number of jurors who are
unwilling to stop their use of texting, social media, and email for an
undefined period of time.67  We understand on a base level what
researchers are explaining on a theoretical level; some of the jurors we
face will be so concerned about maintaining their online existence and
level of connection, they will rush verdicts, fail to engage in delibera-
tion, and be distracted to the point of ineffectiveness.68  For a majority
of other jurors, a less debilitating but equally significant desire to
remain connected may exist.  A very practical and commonsense expec-
tation of continuous connection has become part of our changing
world, with our ability to stay digitally connected linking forever with
our capability of protecting property, livelihood, and loved ones.
D. The Realistic Expectations of a Digital Society
It may be difficult to pinpoint the exact day and hour when we
evolved into a digitally dependent society, but for many, that moment
arrived on August 25, 2005 when Hurricane Katrina brought unimagin-
able death and destruction to the Gulf Coast.  As the wind and water of
this once Category Five hurricane assaulted the city of New Orleans,
property damage in the region climbed past the seventy billion dollar
mark and the loss of life commenced its deadly climb past a thousand
souls.69  Due to infrastructure and equipment damage, millions of cell
towers and phone lines became unusable—family and friends were dis-
connected from all voice communication.70  To the surprise of many,
text messaging remained operative on many cell phones.71  As survi-
64. See CHEN, supra note 2, at 160–61. R
65. Id.
66. Paul Atchley et al., The Choice to Text and Drive in Younger Drivers: Behavior May
Shape Attitude, 43 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 134, 134–42 (2011).
67. See Douglas Keene, Panic on Tweet Street: “Without Twitter, I Felt Jittery and Naked”,
JURY ROOM BLOG (Aug. 7, 2009), http://keenetrial.com/blog/2009/08/07/panic-on-
tweet-street-without-twitter-i-felt-jittery-and-naked/.
68. See Susan K. McClellan, Externships for Millennial Generation Law Students: Bridging
the Generation Gap, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 255, 270 (2009) (observing law students who are in
constant need of social connection).
69. Paul Piper & Miguel Ramos, A Failure to Communicate Politics, Scams, and Informa-
tion Flow During Hurricane Katrina, 14 SEARCHER 40, 41 (2006).
70. Id.
71. Id. I first became aware of this phenomenon several years ago when I was asked
to teach at the Defender Training Institute for Louisiana Public Defenders.  Participants
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vors, evacuees, and concerned family and friends desperately attempted
to connect, they found that their only mode of communication was dig-
ital.  They also realized that their new lifeline of safety and comfort was
no longer dependent upon the traditional act of speaking and
listening.
The simple reality facing the legal profession today is that people
generally, and jurors specifically, rationally equate safety for their fami-
lies and themselves with their uninterrupted ability to remain digitally
connected.72  An increasing number of natural disasters, the terrorism
of 9/11, and an epidemic of school and public shootings have perma-
nently amplified our expectation of continuous communication.73
Today, parents are sent a text or email when children are facing either
eminent or long-term threats at school.74  College campuses facilitate
lockdowns in active shooter situations by way of text.75  Weather warn-
ings pop-up on smart devices as quickly as the National Weather Service
can discern a threat in a targeted area.76  Digital communication is
used by agencies to warn of epidemics or spreading sickness.77
Digital connection is no longer a fad and disconnection is no
longer a mere inconvenience.  Society has permanently changed in the
past decade, and with such change, courts must accommodate jurors’
need to remain connected to warnings, information, and the comfort-
ing text from a child who has arrived home safely.78  A landline number
that reaches a court clerk in case of an emergency is an obsolete solu-
tion to the myriad challenges facing a disconnected parent or a
caregiver assisting a disabled adult or child.  “People love their new
technologies of connection.  They have made parents and children feel
conveyed to me how, as students at Loyola and Tulane in 2005, they attempted to commu-
nicate to family and friends that they had survived the devastation.  They soon realized all
attempts to call out of the stricken area or dial a cell phone originating from New Orleans
was futile, but text messages worked.  For these new Defenders, digital connection was the
only way families knew they had successfully evacuated and/or survived Hurricane
Katrina.
72. TURKLE, supra note 20, at 248.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Letter from John Brinkley, Superintendent, E. Lynne 40 Pub. Sch. to
Parents/Guardians, http://www.eastlynne40school.org/vimages/shared/vnews/stories/
5510612689fdf/Tornado%20Warning%20Letter.pdf (informing parents that they will
receive a text when students are moved into a shelter during tornado warnings).
75. See, e.g., Active Shooter Response Training, UNIV. OF NEB. LINCOLN, http://emer-
gency.unl.edu/shotsfired (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (“During an emergency, the UNL
community and general public will receive information through the web and news media
as well as by email and text through UNL Alert.”).
76. See Weather Warnings on the Go!, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://
www.nws.noaa.gov/com/weatherreadynation/wea.html#.VexY3dLBzGc (last visited Mar.
30, 2016) (“America’s wireless industry is helping to build a Weather-Ready Nation
through a nationwide text emergency alert system, called Wireless Emergency Alerts
(WEA), which will warn you when weather threatens.”).
77. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention allows the public to receive
Health Alert Network (“HAN”) updates by way of e-mail or RSS feed. Health Alert Network
(HAN), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://emergency.cdc.gov/han/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2016).
78. TURKLE, supra note 20, at 248.
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more secure and have revolutionized business, education, scholarship
and medicine.”79  Stripping away a feeling of security from a sitting
juror will undoubtedly impact a process dependent on the individual
focus and engaged dialogue of the participants.80
Additionally, the smart device has also permanently changed the
way people conduct business or ply a profession.81  Today, our ability to
survive at work is predicated upon our ability to connect.82  Many work-
ers perform duties away from offices and workspaces separated from
the traditional desk and phone.  They practice skills and professions
remotely—from locations around the globe—using computers, phones,
and smart devices.  People are removing themselves from established
places of business and traveling into locations of “learning and eco-
nomic activity.”83  With a changing work environment, an expectation
has also evolved that workers will remain connected, in touch, and
ready for a changing professional environment.84  For some, this expec-
tation remains during off hours or when on vacation.  Court rules and
jury instructions may be adequate to alter the actions of a sitting juror,
but they are ineffective in changing the realities and expectations of the
institutions or individuals that control our economic survival; and they
do little to calm our anxieties when we are forced to disconnect.
Contributing to a juror’s anxiety is the court’s general inability to
guarantee the duration of disconnection.  By its very nature, jury delib-
erations are not controlled by time limitations.  Judges manage the tim-
ing of recesses, daily adjournments, and, in cases of hung juries, the
length of deliberations.  But generally, jurors will be confronted with a
mandated experience lasting for an unknown period.85  In courts that
remove smart devices, jurors will commence a period of deliberation
with no time limit placed upon their digital isolation and no guarantee
of an exact date and time when connection will resume.  Jurors instinc-
tively know the faster they reach a verdict, the sooner they will be able
to reconnect.  Even when and if jurors are allowed to reconnect at the
79. Id. at 152.
80. See ABRAMSON, supra note 42, at xi.
81. TURKLE, supra note 20, at 152.
82. See Naveen Gupta, Texting, the Great Untapped Business Resource, FAST CO. (Mar.
11, 2013, 7:02 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3006745/texting-great-untapped-busi-
ness-resource (“Texting can be a powerful means of communication for businesses.  It
can be used effectively as a tool for internal communications among staff, between
employees and business partners.  And most importantly, texting is a way of getting closer
to and satisfying customer needs.”).
83. TURKLE, supra note 20, at 152.
84. Id. at 166 (describing one of a number of interviews with professionals who
remain connected at all times because of an expectation of continual contact by their
work or clients).
85. See Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein, Do Juror Pressures Lead to Unfair Ver-
dicts?, 39 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 18, 18 (2008) (“In general, there are no limits on deliber-
ation time, but the jurors may have felt pressure to reach a quick decision because of the
upcoming holiday.  Juries in other cases might experience similar pressure to wrap up a
long trial or finish before the weekend.  Research indicates that decisions made under
time pressure are not as sound as those made under less pressure due to factors such as
greater reliance on heuristic reasoning.”).
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end of each day, they will still experience the anxiety of being out of
touch during the workday, when their work is most in need of their
input and expertise, and when family and friends are on the move, away
from home and exposed to the dangers of the real world.  It is this
factor of unknown duration that exacerbates all the pragmatic causes of
disconnection anxiety.86
The world has changed and with that change has evolved a con-
stant need to remain linked to our families, friends, and workplace.
Digital connection has become the new normal way of empowering our-
selves with networks, information, and organizations.  And for many of
our fellow citizens, a life without smart devices, apps, and social media
is unknown.  For some, digital dependency and addiction has become a
reality, with thoughts of disconnection being unfathomable.  In the first
part of this article, I have explored the possible impact on people gen-
erally when their smart phones are involuntarily removed for an
unspecified period of time, and I have drawn connections to the likely
impact on sitting jurors who, because of court rules, are unable to
access their phones for undefined periods.87  In the next section I will
review how courts from across the nation have implemented rules and
issued orders limiting the possession or use of smart devices by sitting
and deliberating jurors.  I start by examining the perception, but possi-
bly not the reality, of widespread juror electronic misconduct.
II. POWER, POSSESSION, AND PRIVACY
A. Limiting Smart Devices by Court Rule or Order
To understand why some courts are banning and confiscating
juror smart phones, it is helpful to first acknowledge judges, like the
general public, are impacted by media coverage of electronic based mis-
conduct.88  A review of legal scholarship by both judges and law stu-
dents finds listings of instances—reported in the press—where jurors
ignored instructions and used their devices as a tool for misconduct.89
Two examples cited by more than one author are an Arkansas case and
a case from the United Kingdom.90  In Arkansas, the juror ignored the
instructions of the court and “[t]weeted information, along with their
own thoughts and impressions,” and in Britain, a juror was dismissed
86. See generally id.
87. See Marcy Zora, Note, The Real Social Network: How Jurors’ Use of Social Media and
Smart Phones Affects a Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Rights, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 595–96
(2012) (discussing why phones should not be banned from the courtroom or delibera-
tion room).
88. See, e.g., Antoinette Plogstedt, E-Jurors: A View from the Bench, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
597, 608–12 (2013); see also Jacqueline Connor & Anne Endress Skove, Dial “M” For Mis-
conduct: The Effect of Mass Media and Pop Culture on Juror Expectations, in FUTURE TRENDS IN
STATE COURTS 2004, at 104 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2004) (discussing how the media
reports on issues of juror misconduct).
89. Compare Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 608–12, with David Goldstein, The Appear-
ance of Impropriety and Jurors on Social Networking Sites: Rebooting the Way Courts Deal with Juror
Misconduct, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589 (2011).
90. Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 608–09; see also Goldstein, supra note 89, at 589.
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from a trial after polling friends on Facebook as to the innocence or
guilt of the defendant.91  In one article, Judge Antoinette Plogstedt
cites separate examples of jurors researching cases on Google, jurors
blogging about their upcoming service, jurors “friend requesting” the
defendant, jurors “friend requesting” witnesses, jurors “friend request-
ing” each other, and a prospective juror tweeting his or her impressions
of guilt.92  These documented examples of misconduct are surely not
lost on a judiciary attempting to provide a fair trial to all litigants.
Apart from the headlines, the reality of electronic misconduct by
jurors may be far less pervasive than the anecdotal evidence suggests.93
In a 2013 survey of federal judges, 93.3% of respondents indicated they
had experienced no detectable instances of social media use by jurors
at trials or during deliberations.94  “The use of social media by jurors
during trials and deliberations is still not a common occurrence, and
has not increased in frequency over the past two years.”95  Of the
respondents who did detect jurors using social media, the judges could
only cite one or two instances with few cases occurring during delibera-
tions.96  The response rate of only forty-eight percent of active and
senior federal judges may also indicate a lack of urgency in combating
this rare but perceived problem.97  Despite evidence to the contrary,98
judges across the nation are banning phones and confiscating devices
from jurors.
Indiana directly bans the possession of digital devices during jury
deliberations.99  By way of court rule, the Indiana Supreme Court has
required all trial judges in the state (to instruct their bailiff), “to collect
and store all computers, cell phones or other electronic communica-
tion devices from jurors upon commencing deliberations.”100  With lit-
tle discretion allowed by a judge, the rule clearly directs devices to be
returned only “upon completion of deliberations or when the court
permits separation during deliberations.”101  Under this rule, the trial
court has complete authority to enforce this ban without exception.102
91. Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 608–09; see also Goldstein, supra note 89, at 589.
From a review of the literature, it appears the British juror example is cited in several
articles as an example of misconduct.
92. Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 608–12.
93. See MEGHAN DUNN, FED. JUD. CTR., JURORS’ AND ATTORNEYS’ USE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA DURING VOIR DIRE, TRIALS, AND DELIBERATIONS 4, 15 (2014), https://www.nacdl
.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=38031&libID=38001.
94. Id. at 4.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 4, 15; see also Connor & Skove, supra note 88, at 104–05.  Judge Connor
provides an excellent explanation of why judges may perceive a problem that may not
exist: “Because juror misconduct is rare, the media report such stories at a very high rate.
The public, however, may assume from reading such reports that misconduct is com-
mon.” Id.
99. IND. JURY R. 26(b) (2010).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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The court “may” allow “appropriate communications (i.e., arranging
for transportation, childcare, etc.) that are not related to the case and
may require such communications to be monitored by the bailiff.”103
But this exception to the ban is not mandated.104  If an individual is a
sitting juror in Indiana, he or she will endure an undetermined forced
period of separation from the devices that connect them to their world.
In some cases a judge may decide not to allow any communications even
for childcare or transportation.105  The Indiana rule also acknowledges
that certain jurisdictions in the state have implemented a complete ban
on digital devices in the courthouse, impacting all citizens who report
for jury duty.106
In Maryland, a similar procedural rule states, “An electronic device
may not be brought into a jury deliberation room.”107  Jurors are “gen-
erally” allowed to possess devices like smart phones in Maryland court-
houses but they are also warned that some jurisdictions will not allow
them in the courtrooms.108  Maryland is similar to other jurisdictions,
allowing for the possession of cell phones in most courtrooms only if
the devices are turned off or inoperable.109  Of special note are the
states of Arkansas and New York, which have adopted jury instructions
for judges who want to ban devices from their courtroom,110 and Mis-
souri, which has an instruction informing jurors that judges have “con-
siderable” discretion to dictate cell phone usage.111
The outright ban on devices by supreme court or appellate court
rules is not yet common in states outside of Indiana and Maryland, but
a significant number of judges and jurisdictions across the country are
removing or banning instruments of digital communications.112  In
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Indiana Jury Rule 26(b) allows for the scenario where courts could exer-
cise discretion in a way that forces a deadlocked or hung jury to reach a verdict.  By
depriving jurors of their ability to communicate, a judge could intentionally or inadver-
tently force a verdict when a mistrial is an appropriate outcome.  Unfortunately, this unin-
tended consequence may occur any time a court is allowed to remove a digital device
during deliberations.
106. Id. (“Courts that prohibit such devices in the courthouse are not required to
provide this instruction.”).
107. MD. R. P. 16-110(b)(2)(D).
108. At the Courthouse, MD. COURTS, http://www.courts.state.md.us/juryservice/
atcourthouse.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
109. Id.  See also Eric P. Robinson, Jury Instructions for the Modern Age: A 50-State Survey
of Jury Instructions on Internet and Social Media, 1 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 307, 315, 326,
327, 330, 332, 340, 356, 367–68, 374, 391 (2011) (listing of state and federal circuit courts
instructing jurors (or with sample instructions) to turn off or not use devices when in the
courtroom and/or during deliberations, including the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Texas).
110. Robinson, supra note 109, at 328, 392; ARK. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIM.
100-A (2016).
111. Robinson, supra note 109, at 361.
112. See Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 628; Goldstein, supra note 89, at 599; Zachary
Mesenbourg, Note, Voir Dire in the #LOL Society: Jury Selection Needs Drastic Updates to Remain
Relevant in the Digital Age, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459, 479 (2013). See also Tricia R.
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Alaska, jurors are informed that they are allowed to bring cell phones
and digital devices when they report for jury duty, but “court personnel
may collect these items and hold them for you when jury deliberation
begins.”113  In New Jersey, a policy of the Superior Court allows judges
to restrict the possession of electronic devices including the forced sur-
render of phones and tablets.114  In Orange County, Florida, the
removal of cell phones and electronic devices—when jurors commence
deliberations—has become so commonplace the practice has evolved
into a “local custom.”115
From Malheur County, Oregon to the Federal District Court pre-
siding in Western Louisiana, jurors are banned from possessing cell
phones from the moment they arrive for jury duty.116  In the Malheur
County example, potential jurors are informed by the circuit court web-
site that all cell phones should be left at home or in their car.117  In
some jurisdictions, a complete ban on all devices in the courthouse
complex results in jurors being unable to utilize cell or smart phone
communications at all.118
The above examples of jurors being denied access to their personal
devises of connection may indicate a growing trend by states, courts,
and judges to utilize bans and device confiscation as a way to prevent
jurors from engaging in digital misconduct.  The same report to the
Federal Judicial Center that declares social media use by jurors is “not
common” indicates that a number of federal judges are confiscating
DeLeon & Janelle S. Forteza, Is Your Jury Panel Googling During the Trial?, 52 ADVOC. 36, 38
(2010) (listing states that have counties banning cell phones in the courtroom).
113. ALASKA CT. SYS., ALASKA TRIAL JURY HANDBOOK 9 (2016), http://www.courtre
cords.alaska.gov/webdocs/forms/j-180.pdf.
114. N.J. SUPER. CT., POLICY REGULATING JURORS’ USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES DUR-
ING JUROR SERVICE (2010), https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/jury/juror_wireless_use.pdf.
115. Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 628.
116. Sharon Nelson et al., The Legal Implications of Social Networking, 22 REGENT U. L.
REV. 1, 1–2 (2009). See also Possession and Use of Electronic Devices in the Courthouse, U.S.
DIST. COURT, W. DIST. OF LA., http://www.lawd.uscourts.gov/possession-and-use-elec-
tronic-devices-courthouse (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (providing for no juror exception to
the following rule: “No electronic device, including but not limited to cellular phones,
pagers, laptop computers and personal digital assistants (PDAs) may be bought into or
used in any Courthouse in the Western District of Louisiana by visitors to the Courthouse
without the prior approval of a judge of this court, except as set forth in the following
paragraphs.”).
117. Jury Service, MALHEUR CTY. CIRCUIT COURT, OR. JUDICIAL DEP’T, http://courts
.oregon.gov/Malheur/Pages/JuryService.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (“Leave the fol-
lowing items at home or locked in your car.  All cell phones, Ipods, cameras, no recording
devices of any type; any type of weapons, pocket knives, scissors and chemical sprays.  You
will be instructed to not discuss the trial with anyone.  Also, no emailing, text messaging,
tweeting, blogging or any other form of communication.  We do not allow jurors to main-
tain possession of their cell phones during trial.”).
118. See, e.g., Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 629 (“In the US District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, all courthouse visitors are precluded from bringing cell
phones, laptops, and cameras into the courthouse, without the express order of judge.
This practice promotes security and also limits juror misconduct while inside the court-
house building.”) (internal citation omitted). See also U.S. DIST. COURT, SAM M. GIBBONS
U.S. COURTHOUSE, TAMPA JURY BROCHURE (2015), https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/Jury/
TampaJuryBrochure.pdf.
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phones in order to prevent jurors from utilizing social media inappro-
priately.119  In the survey of federal judges, 30.1% of respondents in
2013 indicated they had confiscated jurors’ phones and other devices as
a way to prevent juror misconduct during deliberations.120  In 2011, the
percentage of responding federal judges using confiscation as a tool
was 28.9%.121  A smaller but significant number indicated they had con-
fiscated devices prior to trial each day.122  Additionally, 17 judges out of
the 494 responding to the survey indicated, “their courthouse does not
permit electronic devices or cell phones in the court house.”123
Jurists, practitioners, students, and academics have all advocated
for judicial device confiscation in articles and blogs.124  As recently as
2013, scholarship in this area proposes, “Courts must ban juror cell
phone use during the trial proceedings and must confiscate juror cell
phones, laptop computers, iPads, tablets, e-readers and other electronic
devices during juror deliberations.”125  The same proponents of confis-
cation justify this extreme remedy by indicating, “These minimum pro-
tections are necessary to ensure the integrity of the trial.”126  Experts in
the field of technology and cyber law champion this growing trend
toward asking jurors to relinquish their cell phones.127  Practicing attor-
neys advocate that courts ignore the “separation anxiety” of jurors and
“collect” the devices before deliberation, and in Florida this same mes-
sage is reinforced to judges in seminars.128  Some of our best legal
minds have succumbed to the lure of the seemingly easy solution of
device confiscation while our nation’s highest court is implicitly convey-
ing a very different message.
119. See DUNN, supra note 93, at 9–10.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 10.
124. See Anita Ramasastry, Why Courts Need to Ban Jurors’ Electronic Communications
Devices, FINDLAW (Aug. 11, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20090811
.html (“And while jurors are in the courthouse, the best solution will likely be to ask them
to check their own electronic devices, yet also make telephones available for their use.
After all, justice requires us to pay attention in court and not to be thinking about our
next text, Tweet or Web search.”). See also Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 630 (“Courts must
ban juror cell phone use during the trial proceedings and must confiscate juror cell
phones, laptop computers, iPads, tablets, e-readers and other electronic devices during
juror deliberations.  These minimum protections are necessary to ensure the integrity of
the trial.”); Mesenbourg, supra note 112, at 481 (acting as an example of a law student
calling for a ban).
125. Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 630.
126. Id.
127. See Ramasastry, supra note 124 (“Anita Ramasastry, a FindLaw columnist, is the
D. Wayne and Anne Gittinger Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of
Law in Seattle and a Director of the Shidler Center for Law, Commerce & Technology.
She has previously written on business law, cyberlaw, computer data security issues, and
other legal issues for this site, which contains an archive of her columns.”).
128. Patrick M. Delaney, Sorry Linus, I Need Your Security Blanket: How the Smartphone,
Constant Connectivity with the Internet, and Social Networks Act as Catalysts for Juror Misconduct,
24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 473, 497 (2011).
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B. Riley v. California and a Jurors’ Expectation of Privacy
As judges across the nation continued to seize the phones of jurors,
the Supreme Court spoke to the powerful bond between individual and
device.129  In Riley v. California, Chief Justice Roberts recognized the
“pervasive and insistent” nature of our devices.130  He also commented
on how our phones have become an inseparable part of our person.131
To make this point, the Court emphasized that nearly seventy-five per-
cent of Americans are within five feet of their cell phones “most of the
time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the
shower.”132
Not only did Riley recognize the existence of a new normal of indi-
vidual human connection, but the opinion also advanced the idea of
how major portions of our private modern lives are contained in smart
devices, and citizens maintain a high expectation of protecting their
digital information.133  This expectation of privacy along with our antic-
ipation of constant use understandably provokes anxiety over phone
separation and device confiscation.
Modern cell phones are not just another technological conve-
nience.  With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold
for many Americans the privacies of life.  The fact that technology
now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand
does not make the information any less worthy of the protection
for which the Founders fought.134
Arguably, the Founders also fought for Americans to be free from the
anxiety of government-mandated separation from our most private con-
nections, information, and possessions. Riley begs a question for all
judges that ban phones today: Why not also remove a juror’s purse or
wallet before he or she enters the deliberation room?  A (small but
impactful) dictionary may lurk inside these items.
In addition to following the legal holding of Riley, judges from
around the nation should embrace the Riley opinion’s overarching mes-
sage: smart devices have become an indivisible part of our person.135  It
makes little sense for a judge in Indiana (who follows Riley) to suppress
a warrantless search of a cell phone but, in a trial on the same litigation,
remove from each juror his or her smart device.  It also is counterintui-
tive for federal courts to spend time carefully reviewing warrant applica-
129. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
130. Id. at 2484.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2490 (citing HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2013 MOBILE CONSUMER HABITS STUDY
(2013)).
133. Id. (“Today, by contrast, it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more
than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record
of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”) (citation
omitted).
134. Id. at 2494–95 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
135. See DeLeon, supra note 111, at 38–39 (providing an interview with state judges
who believe banning devices in the courtroom is “extreme” and causes juror aggravation
and anger).
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tions for digital media but to unconditionally allow for the seizure of
phones.136  In Riley, Chief Justice Roberts condenses in a few phrases
what social scientists and researchers have been reporting for years.
What would be obvious to any alien visitor should also be obvious to our
courts and trial judges: the forced separation of a cell phone from a
juror would have the same impact as separating from that juror “an
important feature of”137 his or her person and who they are.138
III. A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MODERN CONNECTED JUROR
One of the many advantages of authoring an article as a practi-
tioner are those moments of deep dialogue, when a fellow litigator
spontaneously and succinctly articulates an idea or analogy, capturing
the essence of advanced trial work.  For me, that moment came when a
colleague (both litigator and accomplished musician) spoke of her con-
nection with audiences, performing violin pieces as part of a symphony
orchestra.139  She described her concert audiences as being part of the
performance, providing an energy and rhythm to the work of the arti-
sans.  The existence of the listener was synergistically bound to the pres-
entation of the musician and the very nature of the concert being
dependent upon an unspoken interaction between orchestra and con-
certgoers.  But can jurors and juries listening to a trial be compared to
concert attendees?  Similarly, one of my law student interns and a for-
mer graduate student with teaching experience recently spoke of her
connection with students, teaching college level courses as part of her
graduate level duties.140  She described her students as being con-
nected to her presentation, providing a deep influence on how she
presented the material.  The nonverbal actions of the students were
tied to the presentation of the material and the very nature of the class
became dependent upon an unspoken interaction between lecturer
and listener.
It is acknowledged by this author that not all litigators are teachers
or musicians, and not all jurors bring the same joy and cooperation to
the presentation of evidence as do the audiences of a musical perform-
ance.  But the concept of empowering, educating, and synergistically
interacting with jurors should not be a lost analogy on a profession pre-
paring for a post-digital age of individuals becoming one with
technology.
136. See DUNN, supra note 93, at 9. See also Lulu Chang, Facebook Tastes Its Own
Medicine, Forced to Hand over User Information, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jul. 21, 2015), http://
www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/sorry-facebook-not-even-social-media-is-more-power-
ful-than-a-search-warrant/ (providing an example of a federal court enforcing a warrant
on Facebook).
137. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
138. Id. at 2494–95.
139. These observations were based on conversations with St. Louis area litigator
and professional musician Stephanie To.
140. This observation was based on conversations with Mari Katherine Webb, a
member of the St. Louis University School of Law Class of 2016 and a former graduate
student at Memphis State University.
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The phenomenon of musical connection and educational interac-
tion informed me in understanding how juries could better connect
with lawyers, litigants, and cases.  It also reminded me that many of the
books and articles I had reviewed in preparation for writing this piece
had painted jurors in a very different light than how my colleague had
described her positive experiences with audiences.141  The existing
literature on juries and the removal of smart devices is grounded in a
profession-wide fear of juror misconduct.142  There is no shortage of
anecdotal yet documented evidence of jurors using instruments of con-
nection to improperly obtain information about case facts or litigants,
communicate to others about the proceedings in violation of court
instructions, and use their phones instead of engaging in delibera-
tions.143  What is also evident from the existing literature is that courts
and lawyers that are proponents of removing a juror’s smart phone base
their concerns on a distrust of a juror’s ability to follow instructions and
keep promises made in voir dire.144  But does a paternalistic and fearful
approach to juries, by judges and lawyers, empower jurors to return
inconvenient and unpopular verdicts?  And does the true misconduct
exist in the undetectable rushed and convenient verdicts of a discon-
nected juror?
Renowned jury scholar Jeffrey Abramson observes how juries over
time have risked imprisonment to render a verdict they believed just,
resisted the witch hunts for perceived communists in this country, “shel-
tered fugitive slaves and the abolitionists who helped them escape,”
found art in the photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe, and overcame
the established power to find for dissenters like John Hancock, Angela
Davis, and Father Phillip Berrigan.145  He also notes how juries
throughout history have acquiesced to the conventional wisdom of the
day, returning verdicts saturated in popular bias and convenience.146
The premise of this article, of trusting jurors to keep and appropri-
ately use their smart devices, is based on the belief that the modern
juror will resist returning verdicts that are personally expedient if
judges and lawyers promote an atmosphere of trust and empowerment.
One way to communicate distrust and promote disempowerment is to
141. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 173 (2011); MARK GERAGOS & PAT HARRIS, MISTRIAL: AN INSIDE
LOOK AT HOW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM WORKS AND SOMETIMES DOESN’T 206 (2013)
(“The founding fathers intended that the leading citizens of the community would serve
as the jury pool for trials.  Today most of the leading citizens are going to get out of jury
service.”).
142. Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 598.
143. SUNWOLF, PRACTICAL JURY DYNAMICS2: FROM ONE JUROR’S TRIAL PERCEPTIONS
TO THE GROUP’S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 606–07 (2007).
144. Plogstedt, supra note 88, at 629.
145. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOC-
RACY 1 (1994).
146. Id. (“The names of the Sottsboro Boys and of Emmett Till, Viola Liuzzo, Lem-
uel Penn, and Medgar Evers mark the miscarriages of justice perpetrated by an all-white
jury system that was democratic in name only.”).
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mandate the removal of an individual smart device based on the
assumption that jurors are likely to engage in misconduct.
The state of art practiced by many innovative modern litigators is
less about “demand” from and “fear” of jurors, and more centered on
showing respect, providing leadership, and cultivating juror empower-
ment.147  Recognized trial attorneys have accepted the fact that the
modern juror has precious little time (because of personal and profes-
sional demands) to sit through “lengthy and tedious presentations.”148
As a result of this observation, innovative trainers from across the coun-
try are teaching less experienced trial attorneys to put aside their fear of
jury selection and embrace the beliefs, priorities, concerns, and rights
of individual jurors.149  Demonstrating to each individual on the jury
that they are respected members of the process and judicial system is
empowering (and trusting) them to bring forward their own personal
beliefs of justice, fairness, and equality.150
Conversely, if courts and lawyers demonstrate to jurors that they
are not respected or trusted and their individual concerns and beliefs
are not valued, an environment of disempowerment is fostered.  If we,
as a society, celebrate the past “courage of jurors willing to protect dis-
senters from the orthodoxies of the day,”151 then how can the legal
system, in good conscience, send messages of disrespect and distrust to
each juror by removing his or her smart device?
The digital age has shifted how we as a profession must look at
juror misconduct.  Today, legal scholarship is saturated with examples
of jurors consulting smart devices in the jury room, and with jurors
searching for information not addressed by the evidence at trial or the
official jury instructions.152  But the same juror will likely retire from a
trial or deliberation at the end of the day and conduct the same search
147. See TREY COX, WINNING THE JURY’S ATTENTION: PRESENTING EVIDENCE FROM
VOIR DIRE TO CLOSING 3–4 (2011). See also Mary Moriarty, infra note 149 (providing an
example of training materials on jury selection).
148. COX, supra note 147, at 4.
149. See Beverly Beimdiek, Powerpoint Presentation: Getting Jurors to Talk (Jan.
2014) (on file with author); Mary F. Moriarty, Powerpoint Presentation: Theory-Based
Voir Dire (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nysacdl.org/wp/wp-content/noindex/Buf-
falo2013/MoriartyCombined.pdf.
150. See Goldstein, supra note 89, at 602 (discussing how taking a juror’s property
will result in feelings of oppression and lost control).
151. ABRAMSON, supra note 145, at 1.  In the introduction to his book, Abramson
notes that juries over time have become known for their heroic courage, as compared to
juries throughout history whose infamous verdicts are now regarded in a critical light.  Id.
152. See, e.g., Robbie Manhas, Note, Responding to Independent Juror Research in the
Internet Age: Positive Rules, Negative Rules, and Outside Mechanisms, 809 MICH. L. REV. 812,
815–16 (2014).  This student note provides an excellent example of how the newest mem-
bers of the legal profession are seeking innovative solutions (other than the removal of
devices) to the problem of digital based juror misconduct.  Manhas also discusses how
forbidding the use of phones during trial or deliberations “is a sensible rule.”  Id. at 815.  I
agree partially with Manhas in that instructing and educating a jury not to use devices
during trial and deliberations (but allowed at breaks) is sensible, but I take issue when
forbidding device usage evolves into removal and over restriction.
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in the privacy of his or her home.153  We fear jurors who are distracted
by the continuous usage of smart devices, who do not participate in the
rigors of deliberation, or who communicate the details of trial and
deliberation by way of social media.154  Yet we are blind to the juror
who is acquiescing to a convenient verdict, consumed by the thought of
unread and unacknowledged text, emails, and alerts, all locked away in
a bailiff’s office.  Litigators (especially lawyers who are presenting a
nonconformist message) are worried about juries obtaining secret
information about them, their case, and their client, but the same liti-
gators are indifferent to the disempowering act of removing a smart
device, encouraging jurors to conform to the demands of authority.155
In short, the legal profession must be on guard against creating a
problem out of a perceived solution.  The unintended consequences
resulting from removing or banning the reasonable use of a smart
device by a citizen juror are real.  These consequences are also under-
standable when lawyers and judges fully accept the extent of our evolu-
tion into a digital society.  To fully understand the consequence of
seizing a device from a juror, an analogy is helpful.  In formal opinions
relating to other ethical issues about jurors and social media, the ABA
has made use of analogies to conceptualize the relationship between
modern technologies and traditional professional standards.156  The
taking of a digital device today is less analogous to removing magazines
and newspapers from the jury room and more akin to confiscating
“[t]he sum of an individual’s private life.”157  Specifically, it is similar to
asking jurors to surrender wallets, purses, private diaries, pictures of
children, credit cards, bank statements, and private phone books, all
before they enter the deliberation room.  All these very private items
are placed in the hands of a stranger for an undetermined period of
time in a location of questionable security.  If this practice was occur-
ring in the more objectionable traditional form, citizens, attorneys, and
judges would be greatly alarmed.  That same level of concern is war-
ranted today.
Fortunately, the solutions to the new problems that attend digital
jurors are not new or necessarily creative; they are the traditional meth-
153. See id. at 816. See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE
VERDICT 115 (2007). Vidmar and Hans describe how in the O.J. Simpson jury trial exten-
sive efforts to sequester the jury “may not have worked” in preventing outside information
from reaching the individual jurors.  This observation begs the question: if a juror wants
to search for information outside of the trial, can the simple taking away of a smart device
prevent the juror from conducting the same search on the same phone the minute the
juror exits the courthouse? Id. For two additional pieces of scholarship, see also
Mesenbourg, supra note 112, at 480; Laura W. Lee, Silencing the “Twittering Juror”: The Need
to Modernize Pattern Cautionary Jury Instructions to Reflect the Realities of the Electronic Age, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 181, 205–06 (2010).
154. See Manhas, supra note 152, at 815.
155. See SUNWOLF, supra note 143, at 606–07.
156. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF. RESP., Formal Op. 466 (2014), http://www
.almd.uscourts.gov/docs/aba_formal_opinion_466.pdf.
157. Compare Ralph Artigliere et al., Reining in Juror Misconduct: Practical Suggestions
for Judges and Lawyers, 84 FLA. B.J. 8 (2010) (noting the analogy of removing items from
the jury room), with Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
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ods of juror education and instruction that we as a profession have uti-
lized throughout our history.158  Well-reasoned instructions from the
court explaining smart device policy accompanied by an interactive and
educational voir dire by attorney and/or judge will promote a model of
trust, dialogue, and empowerment.159
These four simple ideas will safeguard both the individual’s inter-
est in connectedness and the court’s interest in justice: (1) courts
should never remove or forbid the possession of a smart device by a
juror at any stage of the proceeding or at any location in the court-
house; (2) courts should continue to create and utilize reasoned
instructions on the appropriate use of smart devices by jurors, especially
when it comes to when and how the device is utilized; (3) litigators
and/or courts should engage in an educational dialogue with jurors as
part of their existing voir dire process, discussing why certain well-rea-
soned restrictions on smart device usage are imposed and inquire if
jurors can follow the limitations set out by the court; and (4) if courts
instruct jurors to disable (turn off) or not use a smart device during
trial or deliberations, predictable and adequate breaks should be sched-
uled, allowing jurors time to utilize phones and devices.
In the digital age, it is a reasonable request to ask jurors not to use
their device of connection when hearing evidence in court.  But it is not
practical to forbid a deliberating juror from returning a text from his or
her child when they use the restroom or eat lunch.  It is reasonable to
instruct jurors not to engage in independent research on their smart
devices or tweet the progress of deliberations.  But do courts inadver-
tently rush verdicts when they seize the phones of thousands of deliber-
ating jurors (every year) in a failed attempt to eliminate a relatively
small number of juror misconduct cases?160  It is important for the legal
profession to be concerned about incidents of jurors engaging in digital
misconduct, but it is disingenuous to speak of its evils without first pro-
moting a profession-wide practice of education and instruction as part
of an effective voir dire.161
CONCLUSION
The banning, seizing, or confiscating of a smart phone belonging
to a juror, in addition to over-restricting the juror’s use of a device, is a
practice that should be discontinued by all judges and courts.  When a
158. See Artigliere et al., supra note 157, at 8.
159. Id. at 12–13.
160. See DUNN, supra note 93, at 9–10, 15.
161. See Robert J. Truhlar, Can We Talk?  Getting to a Policy of Cell Phones in the Court-
room, 33 COLO. LAW. 29 (2004) (discussing a (possibly satirical) proposal on developing a
policy for juror cell phone usage in the court room).  One suggestion for consideration is
allowing jurors to use cell phones at times of sidebars. Id.  This suggestion may have been
made in jest but the idea is more practical today than it was in 2004.  Today, smart devices
would allow for a quick and non-disruptive way for jurors to stay in touch with their net-
work of family and friends.  I use this source even with Truhlar’s tagline: “If any federal
judges read this column: I’m only kidding!” Id. at 30.  I have found over my years of
practice and writing, inspiration for change can come in many forms, including humor.
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juror is disallowed the use or possession of a mechanism of modern
connection and storage, he or she will experience authentic feelings of
anxiety, inattention, lack of control, ostracism, and fear for the wellbe-
ing of others.  Social scientists, our highest court, and our experiences
and common sense inform us that jurors, and arguably their verdicts,
will be impacted by a forced separation from phone possession and
thoughtless restriction of device usage.
Jurors today live in a world were digital connection has become a
normal part of their existence.  For many of these participants, their
lives have always been dominated by their ability to connect.  Research
in the field of smart device usage establishes that individuals can be
impacted cognitively when separated from their phone, and for some
jurors the real phenomenon of digital addiction and obsession will be
overwhelming.  For a majority of jurors, the peace of mind that comes
with being in constant contact with loved ones, close friends, and busi-
nesses is a realistic expectation that should follow them into the deliber-
ation room.  For many deliberators, the idea of being dependent on a
stranger to deliver a written message from their child, delivered on a
court’s voicemail after an emergency arises, will be too overpowering to
fathom.
As society evolves into a digitally-dependent world, courts are
responding to the highly publicized, yet uncommon problem of juror
electronic misconduct, forcing jurors to abandon their smart phone by
way of ban or confiscation.  Fearing jurors will do independent research
or communicate impressions of proceedings, states, counties, and fed-
eral courts are banning cell and smart phones from courthouses, court-
rooms, and deliberation rooms.  Supporting the conclusion that phone
bans are becoming an increasing trend is the mounting existence of
legal scholarship by students, practitioners, judges, and academics advo-
cating for courts to take the devices from jurors.  Ironically, these calls
for device bans take place at a time when our highest court is speaking
to the expectation we all have in being able to securely store and con-
tinually possess the components of our private and professional lives.
The Supreme Court implicitly guides us in understanding how taking a
modern phone for any reason, by any authority, is equivalent to the
taking of an individual’s most private thoughts, associations, posses-
sions, financial instruments, and professional information.  In the case
of jurors, all are seized by a stranger and sequestered in an unknown
place.
The most effective and least intrusive method to combat juror mis-
conduct in the digital age remains well-written jury instructions and a
quality voir dire by a judge or litigator.  A new age of post-digital litiga-
tion is approaching, when all fact finders will be inseparable from their
constant connection to networks and information.  This age will pre-
sent a need for litigators to be empowering and trusting of jurors.  The
disempowering and anxiety-provoking act of taking an individual’s
phone is draconian and archaic.  The time has come for all judges to
allow jurors to possess their devices at all times and allow for their fre-
quent use at appropriate times in the proceedings.  If we expect jurors
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to return reasoned and thoughtful verdicts, we should stop treating
them like misbehaving children and allow them to debate, deliberate,
and decide free from the confines of anxiety and disconnection.
